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Kasky v. Nike: Lurking First Amendment 
 Time Bomb for Marketers? 
 





Abstract - While attention has focused on the U. S. Supreme Court protecting 
corporate political speech, the Court has left untouched a California Supreme 
Court ruling of significance to marketers in their efforts to use advertising and 
public relations to offset what they view as unfair criticism. The case, Kasky v. 
Nike, stems from 1995 accusations that athletic footwear and apparel 
manufacturer Nike exploited and abused employees in Asian sweatshops.  
Through advertising and public relations efforts, Nike denied the claims.  In 
1998, Californian Mark Kasky sued, claiming Nike’s denials violated laws 
regarding unfair competition and false advertising and, because the denials were 
“commercial speech,” they were not protected by the First Amendment.  
California Superior Court dismissed the case and Kasky also lost in the state 
Court of Appeal, but won at the California Supreme Court.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ultimately declined to hear an appeal from Nike. As a result, companies 
doing business in California, including online, risk being charged with false 
advertising when attempting to defend themselves against accusations of unfair, 
illegal, or unethical corporate practices. 
 
Keywords - corporate speech, First Amendment, Kasky v. Nike, advertising, 
public relations, false advertising, Nike, sweatshops.  
 
Relevance to marketing Educators, Researchers and/or Practitioners -   
Contrary to frequent nearly-absolutist First Amendment interpretations, the 
California Supreme Court ruled marketers can be charged with false advertising 
if their defenses against improper  behavior are found to be false. The rulings in 
the case Kasky v. Nike, is not limited to California, since businesses with online 
capability are, in effect, operating within that state. 
Introduction 
Nearly a decade has passed since the U. S. Supreme Court refused to resolve 
certain questions regarding First Amendment rights for businesses.  While the 
Court controversially ruled in favor of corporate political speech in the well-
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known Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010), it has let stand a 
California Supreme Court ruling, Kasky v. Nike (2002). As a result, the Nike case 
can, in effect, muzzle the ability of businesses to defend themselves against 
criticism.  This presents potential hazards for marketers given the importance of 
public relations and corporate and advocacy advertising, especially in areas 
where businesses may find themselves at the center of controversy or the targets 
of organized criticisms. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine part of the legal atmosphere 
surrounding communications by commercial entities. The heart of the problem is 
the extent of First Amendment protection for what is called commercial speech 
and the definition of such speech.  While discussing them, the paper takes no 
position on corporate manufacturing practices, the legitimacy of accusations 
made as a result of those practices, nor the validity of corporate defenses against 
those accusations.  Rather, this paper focuses on questions raised in litigation 
surrounding corporate communications in controversial situations and the 
repercussions of those questions for companies doing business in California 
(including on the internet) or those affected by courts following precedent of the 
California Supreme Court. 
The California Supreme Court ruling stems from accusations in 1995 that 
athletic footwear and apparel manufacturer Nike used sweatshops in Southeast 
Asia where employees were said to be underpaid, exploited, and abused. Nike 
denied the claims through a series of advertising and public relations efforts. In 
1998, California resident Marc Kasky sued, claiming Nike’s denials violated the 
state’s laws regarding unfair competition and false advertising (Goldstein, 2002-
2003). Kasky’s argument was that Nike’s defense about sweatshops was untrue 
and because Nike was engaged in commercial speech in defending itself, Nike 
was promulgating false advertising and the First Amendment did not protect it 
(Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002). 
The originating court, the California Superior Court, dismissed the case 
and Kasky subsequently lost in the state Court of Appeal.  However, upon going 
to the California Supreme Court, Kasky won.  That court claimed Nike was 
engaged in commercial speech which has been recognized to be limited in its 
First Amendment protection.  The state Supreme Court said Nike’s speech was 
aimed at customers and ultimately designed to sell its products (Kasky v. Nike, 
California Supreme Court, 2002). 
Nike appealed to the U. S. Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case, 
but the writ of certiorari was dismissed as improvidentially  granted, meaning 
the Court subsequently decided it should not have agreed to hear the case (Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 2003). 
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Accusations Against Nike’s Asian Manufacturing 
Nike’s manufacturing facilities prompting the controversy were in China, 
Vietnam, and Indonesia. They primarily employed women under the age of 
twenty-four. Nike had agreed to compliance with local laws regarding wages, 
health and safety and protection of the environment (Kasky v. Nike, California 
Supreme Court, 2002).  However, on October 17, 1996, CBS News 48 Hours ran 
a story claiming Nike used sweatshop practices in Vietnam.  In the story, 
reporter Roberta Baskin said women working in Nike-contracted Vietnamese 
factories worked long hours, were underpaid, and were struck by supervisors, 
while Nike made record profits and its founder Phil Knight was listed as the 
sixth richest man in America.  Over the course of the next year, allegations of 
abuse by Nike appeared in the Financial Times, the New York Times, the San 
Franciso Chronicle, Sporting News, and more.  Allegations included forced 
illegal overtime; physical, verbal, and sexual abuse, and unsafe working 
conditions.  
As a result of the accusations, Nike began a public relations campaign 
which included news releases and letters to newspapers, university presidents 
and athletic directors.  Nike said Asian workers in factories it contracted with 
had protections against abuse, were paid a living wage (double, on average, the 
local minimum wage), and received free meals and health care. The company 
also bought full-page newspapers ads to promote a report Nike had contracted 
from GoodWorks International, LLC.  The report stemmed from an investigation 
by former United States Ambassador Andrew Young disclosing no evidence of 
abusive or illegal conditions at Nike-contracted plants in China, Vietnam, and 
Indonesia (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002). 
Initial Filing of Kasky v. Nike 
In 1998, San Francisco political activist Marc Kasky filed suit against Nike over 
the company’s defense against its alleged sweatshop practices in Southeast Asia. 
Kasky claimed Nike had made false statements regarding the welfare of workers 
(Kasky v. Nike, California Superior Court, 1998). Although other companies 
engaged in outsourced Asian labor, Nike’s production practices were long the 
focus of activists despite – or more likely, because of – its carefully crafted image 
of concern for social issues and its role as a celebrity corporation (Knight and 
Greenberg, 2002). 
 An amended version of the suit filed July 2 implied guilt on the part of 
Nike because after the first filing of the lawsuit on April 20, Nike responded 
with a news release on May 12 which said in the future it would change work 
standards to increase the minimum age of workers to sixteen and would follow 
U. S. standards regarding safety and air quality.  The news release also said 
Nike would expand independent monitoring of its manufacturing and 
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educational offerings for workers, and increase its micro-enterprise loan 
program in Southeast Asia  
Also, shortly after the April 20 filing of the unamended lawsuit, Nike on 
June 18 sent a letter to university presidents and athletic directors, claiming the 
company was following all relevant regulations regarding pay and overtime, 
health, safety, environmental conditions and that Nike staff members provided 
daily enforcement. 
In making its argument regarding Nike’s communications, the initial Kasky 
lawsuit said Nike had a code of conduct and memorandum of understanding 
designed to attract as customers those consumers desiring products not made in 
sweatshops.  The suit also quoted a 1997 letter to the editor in the San Francisco 
Examiner by Nike Director of Communications Lee Weinstein which claimed 
that Nike was the leader in the industry in improving conditions in factories 
(Kasky v. Nike, California Superior Court, 1998).   
Kasky argued that by making alleged false claims about its contractors’ 
factories,  Nike had violated the California Business and Professions Code and 
“Nike’s misrepresentations were made with knowledge or with reckless 
disregard of the laws of California prohibiting false and misleading statements” 
(Kasky v. Nike, California Superior Court, 1998: 31-32).  Kasky also claimed 
that Nike was engaged in “unfair business practices” and “committed acts of 
untrue and misleading advertising.” As a remedy, Kasky called for the Superior 
Court to require injunctive relief for Nike to “disgorge all monies which Nike 
acquired” through illegal activity, to launch a court-approved information 
campaign “to correct any Nike statement and/or claim that this Court finds 
misleading or deceitful” and to prohibit Nike from “misrepresenting the working 
conditions under which Nike products are made” (Kasky v. Nike, California 
Superior Court, 1998: 33).  Essentially, Kasky charged that Nike’s defense of 
itself was false advertising. 
In response, Nike called for dismissal of Kasky’s lawsuit, which the 
Superior Court granted.  Nike had argued the First Amendment prohibited the 
suit, as did the California constitution. Kasky then appealed  (Goldstein, 2002-
2003). 
The Appeals Process 
The California Court of Appeal (2000) also ruled against Kasky.   Like the trial 
court, the appeals court focused only on the constitutional issues, and followed 
standard appellant court procedure in a dismissed case in that it assumed 
Kasky’s allegations were true, that Nike had indeed misrepresented facts about 
its Southeast Asian production.  In the appeals process, the California Court of 
Appeal and subsequently the California Supreme Court (2002) and the U. S. 
Supreme Court (2003) examined U. S. Supreme Court precedents regarding the 
concept of commercial speech.  Among cases they cited were Virginia Pharmacy 
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Board. v. Consumer Council (1976) and Bolger v. Young’s Drug Products Corp. 
(1983). 
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Consumer Council 
The Virginia Pharmacy case (1976) recognized First Amendment protection for 
commercial speech. The case involved the Virginia Pharmacy Board’s prohibiting 
pharmacists from advertising prices of prescription drugs. The board claimed 
there was no First Amendment protection against announcing prices because 
pharmacists were involved in commercial speech and in the past the U. S. 
Supreme Court had declined much protection for it. Writing for the majority, 
Justice Harry Blackmun illustrated commercial speech in the context of the 
pharmacist merely wanting to a sell certain drug at a certain price and raised 
the question of whether such communication had any First Amendment 
protection  (Virginia Pharmacy, 1976).  
In upholding the advertising of pharmaceutical prices, Justice Blackmun 
wrote for the court that even though an advertiser may have strictly economic 
motives, the advertiser still should have First Amendment protection.  He 
referred to the long-standing concept that labor disputes are mainly economic, 
but all parties in such disputes enjoy First Amendment freedom.  And regarding 
advertising pharmaceutical prices, consumers, because of physical pain or 
illness, may have more interest in those prices than they do in unquestionably 
protected political speech. In addition, there may be strong societal interest in a 
free flow of commercial information. “So long as we preserve a predominantly 
free enterprise economy, the allocation of our resources in large measure will be 
made through numerous private economic decisions” (Virginia Pharmacy, 1976: 
766). In summary, Virginia Pharmacy opined that even though commercial 
speech can sometimes be regulated, there is critical importance in the free flow 
of market/commercial information that deserves some dimension of First 
Amendment protection. 
Bolger v. Young’s Drug Products Corp. 
The Bolger case represented an attempt by the U. S. Supreme Court to develop 
the modicum of a test to determine what is and what is not commercial speech 
and is cited heavily in the appeals process of Kasky. Determining commercial 
speech seems akin to U. S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart’s oft-quoted 
statement regarding hard-core pornography: “I know it when I see it” (Jacobellis 
v. Ohio, 1964: 184).  Splits among courts at all levels of the appeals process in 
Kasky demonstrated that judges might have a better idea of how to define 
pornography than they do the tests for what is or is not commercial speech. 
Bolger was based upon a federal law prohibiting sending through the mail 
unsolicited advertisements for contraceptives against which Young’s Drug 
Products, a manufacturer and marketer of contraceptives, claimed First 
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Amendment protection for its promotional materials.  In the Bolger decision, the 
Court cited precedent recognizing some dimension of First Amendment 
protection for commercial speech (Bigelow v. Virginia, 1975).  The court cited a 
“common sense distinction” between speech regarding specific transactions 
where fraud may occur – which are subject to regulation – and other types of 
speech (Bolger, 1983: 65).  Examining Young’s claims, the Court noted the 
pamphlets and flyers were advertisements, they promoted products, and they 
were produced for commercial purposes.  The combination of all these factors -- 
advertisements, products, commercial purposes -- meant Young’s printed 
materials were commercial speech.  Despite this, they merited First Amendment 
protection because they dealt with social issues and the government had no 
compelling interest to prohibit the mailing of them (Bolger, 1983). 
Kasky v. Nike in the California Court of Appeal 
Upon receiving Kasky v. Nike, the California Court of Appeal (2000) reiterated 
that commercial speech is limited in ways that noncommercial speech cannot be 
limited and that deceptive or misleading commercial speech is restricted.  It did 
so by citing Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. (1995) which in turn had cited Board 
of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox (1989). The court also cited Bolger, 
discussed earlier in this paper, saying that three factors came into play 
regarding the contraceptive pamphlets: 1) because  they were advertisements 
did not automatically mean they were commercial speech, 2) reference to a 
specific product did not automatically make them commercial speech, and 3) 
economic motivation for mailing the pamphlets did not constitute commercial 
speech.  However, the combination of all three provided strong evidence that a 
lower court was correct in ruling that the pamphlets were commercial speech.  In 
deciding Kasky v. Nike, the California Court of Appeal  said  the  three  factors  
of  Bolger were applied by the U. S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Association of Nat. Advertiser, Inc. v. Lungren (1994) regarding manufacturers 
and distributors of consumer goods making environmental claims about 
products.  The Kasky v. Nike decision also made reference to an earlier decision 
by the U. S. Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in National Commission on Egg 
Nutrition v. Federal Trade Commission (1977) in which the court found false 
advertising in health claims regarding eggs.  But the California Court of Appeal 
said Kasky v. Nike was different. Even though Bolger, Egg Nutrition, and 
Association of National Advertisers were similar to Kasky, they differed because 
they referred to specific goods.  Instead, in Kasky, Nike’s defense against 
criticism did not involve specific products, but rather a good corporate image.  
While that image was needed to sell products, Nike’s communications were not 
focused on selling specific products.  Also, in defending itself, Nike used public 
relations communications, not just advertising.  Not selling specific products and 
not limiting itself to advertising put Nike outside two of the three points of the 
Bolger test, according to the California Court of Appeal. However, the court 
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recognized that false news releases can result in damages requiring injunctive 
relief and that not all three factors in Bolger must be present for speech to be 
considered commercial. “But we think that a public relations campaign focusing 
on corporate image, such as that at issue here, calls for a different analysis than 
that applying to product advertisement” (Kasky v. Nike California Court of 
Appeal, 2000: 7-9).   
The Nike issues, according to the California Court of Appeal, involved 
debate on a public matter.  And like Virginia Pharmacy Board, the court noted 
the parallel with First Amendment protection for speech in labor disputes, citing 
Thornhill v. Alabama (1940): Thornhill said the First Amendment stemmed from 
oppressive government but in an industrial society (as of 1940) there was a need 
for similarly unfettered information in labor disputes.  Nike’s situation “places 
its labor practices in the context of a broader debate” regarding offshoring labor 
once done domestically (Kasky v. Nike California Court of Appeal, 2000: 10).  
Nike’s economic motivation in defending itself, the Court of Appeal said, did not 
remove its First Amendment protections, given public interest in labor practices.  
And the court reiterated that limits on noncommercial speech are narrow, 
related only to libel, obscenity, fighting words, and certain rare situations.   
In summary, the California Court of Appeal said Nike deserved First 
Amendment protection because the case involved corporate image instead of 
products, that it involved public relations, not just advertising, and that public 
issues – in this case, labor practices – were involved. 
Kasky v. Nike in the California Supreme Court 
Kasky then appealed to the California Supreme Court (2002) and there met 
success. As with the Court of Appeal, the state supreme court used the Bolger 
three-point test (advertising format, product references, commercial motivation) 
and found that two of the items were present.      
The California Supreme Court said speech that is false has no 
constitutional value per se, but is protected to preserve the atmosphere required 
for debate of public issues.  Commercial speech “can be effectively regulated to 
suppress false and actually or inherently misleading messages without undue 
risk of chilling public debate” (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 
20).  Because Nike was a “commercial speaker to a commercial audience” making 
comments about its own operations to promote sale of its products, Nike was 
engaged in commercial speech and was under narrow rules than normally 
allowed by standard First Amendment protections of free speech (Kasky v. Nike, 
California Supreme Court, 2002: 2).   
The California Supreme Court also said state regulation of advertising had 
a long history, but it was not until the 1970s that the U. S. Supreme Court ruled 
there was some First Amendment protection for it and cited the Virginia 
Pharmacy Board (1976) case discussed earlier in this paper, and reiterated the 
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idea that free enterprise required a free flow of ideas. And the California 
Supreme Court cited a U. S. Supreme Court case requiring commercial speech to 
be about lawful activity and not be misleading in order to qualify for First 
Amendment protection (Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service 
Commission, 1980).  The California high court also cited the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s position that while there is general protection for false speech – 
especially political speech – such protections are not all-encompassing especially 
where there are no public issues and the false speech is damaging.   It also cited 
the U. S. Supreme Court’s provision of three reasons for making distinctions 
between commercial and noncommercial speech and for not providing First 
Amendment protection for commercial speech that is false: 1) disseminators of 
commercial speech can more easily verify the speech, 2) commercial speech is 
“hardier” than noncommercial speech in that the profit motive means 
commercial speakers “are less likely to experience a chilling effect from speech 
regulation” and 3) government authority to regulate commercial transactions 
means the same authority applies to communications regarding those 
transactions (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 9).   
Ultimately, the California Supreme Court said the U.S. Supreme Court had 
no one-size-fits-all test to determine commercial from noncommercial speech, but 
there could be a “limited purpose” test.  When courts would be required to 
determine if speech is regulated to prevent commercial deception“categorizing a 
particular statement as commercial or non commercial speech requires 
consideration of three elements: the speaker, the intended audience, and the 
content of the message.” (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 12). 
Addressing the three elements, the court said 1) Nike was, indeed, 
functioning as a “commercial speaker;” 2) Nike’s letters to universities and its 
other communications were aimed at potential buyers, and 3) the contents of the 
communications were commercial, “…describing its own labor policies, and the 
practices and working conditions in factories where its products are made.”  
Bringing Nike under regulations against false or misleading speech provides an 
incentive for Nike to verify the truth of its statements which fulfills the U. S. 
Supreme Court’s position on protection of commercial speech to provide the free 
flow of commercial information outlined in the Virginia Pharmacy Board (1976) 
case (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 15). 
The California Supreme Court also rejected Nike’s argument that 
regulating its speech would limit public debate to one point of view, that of 
Nike’s critics, saying California law only limits false commercial speech. 
Expressions of Nike’s opinions on general policy questions are fully protected by 
the First Amendment; Nike’s commercial speech is not.  
Dissenting, Justice Ming Chin said while Nike’s critics rightfully take 
advantage of full First Amendment protection, the court’s majority said Nike 
cannot. “Full free speech protection for one side and strict liability for the other 
will hardly promote vigorous and meaningful debate… Irrespective of Nike’s 
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economic motivation, the public has a right to receive information on the matters 
of public concern” (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 21).  Justice 
Chin also said Nike’s defense of its labor practices was not traditional product-
oriented marketing toward consumers and was not commercial speech. 
Other dissent came from Justice Janice Brown.  She was critical of how the 
majority applied the Bolger three-point test, claiming two of its criteria, identity 
of the speaker and the audience, were not relevant and as a result the California 
Supreme Court majority had departed from the overarching principles of the U. 
S. Supreme Court. “Like the purported discovery of cold fusion over a decade 
ago, the majority’s test for commercial speech promises much, but solves 
nothing.”  She said the test makes First Amendment protection dependent upon 
who the speaker is rather than content, thus “stifling the ability of certain 
speakers to participate in the public debate..[T]he majority unconstitutionally 
favors some speakers over others and conflicts  with  the  decisions  of  other 
courts”  (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 26).  
Also, Justice Brown said: “Nike’s commercial statements about its labor 
practices cannot be separated from its noncommercial statements about a public 
issue, because its labor practices are the public issue” and Nike cannot discuss 
overseas labor practices without bringing in its own overseas labor practices 
(Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 27, emphasis in original).  As a 
result, according to Justice Brown, the Bolger test violates the First Amendment 
by limiting the ability of corporations to participate in debates regarding public 
issues.  Logic of the majority opinion, said Brown, makes commercial speech of 
all corporate speech, something not retained by the U. S. Supreme Court which 
long recognized that in commenting on a public issue a business may by 
necessity promote its products or operation.    
While admitting the California Supreme Court was not bound by the 
decisions, Justice Brown also cited several state cases similar to Kasky.  In 
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. AIP (1994), non-profit defendant AIP 
said through news releases and letter-writing that its scientific journals were 
less expensive and superior to those of for-profit publisher Gordon & Breach.  
When Gordon & Breach sued for false advertising, AIP’s communications were 
held to be non-commercial speech fully protected by the First Amendment.  
Likewise in Oxycal Laboratories, Inc. v. Jeffers (1995), the defendants published 
a book critical of Oxycal’s products which was also designed to promote their 
own products.  Oxycal sued for false advertising, but the court held with Jeffers, 
saying the commercial speech in the case was secondary to the noncommercial 
aspects. The extent of the public issue dimension of Nike’s overseas situation is 
demonstrated, according to Justice Brown, “as various government officials and 
organizations have proposed and passed resolutions condemning Nike’s labor 
practices” (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 26).  
Justice Brown said differences between commercial and noncommercial 
speech are not black and white; rather there is a growing gray area   And the U. 
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S. Supreme Court’s “all or nothing approach” to distinguishing commercial 
speech “will eventually lead us down one of two unappealing paths: either the 
voices of business in public debate will be effectively silenced, or businesses will 
be able to dupe consumers with impunity” (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme 
Court, 2002: 36). 
Nike Appeals to the U. S. Supreme Court 
After losing in the California Supreme Court, Nike appealed to the U. S. 
Supreme Court. The court initially agreed to hear the case, then declined.  
Justice John Paul Stevens wrote the court’s opinion on dismissal with Justices 
Ruth Ginsberg and David  Souter  concurring.  The Court said there were three 
reasons for dismissal: 1) the California Supreme Court never entered a final 
judgment, meaning the U. S. Supreme Court could not have jurisdiction, 2) 
neither party had standing to bring the issue to federal courts – Kasky was 
functioning on his own behalf and had suffered no damage; Nike had no 
standing because the California Supreme Court had merely affirmed the case 
against Nike’s claim that it was irrelevant -- and 3) the U. S. Supreme Court 
already had rules in effect balancing commercial against noncommercial speech 
and questions in the Nike case would better be served in a full study of the 
record of facts than in the unproven statements of a pleading.   
Dissenting from the dismissal, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote that the 
case involved free speech regarding public matters and delaying a decision might 
restrict free speech; that Nike, at least had standing since it could suffer harm 
from Kasky’s lawsuit and was, in effect, limited by California law in what it 
could say.  Also, despite the U. S. Supreme Court’s statement that the California 
Supreme Court never entered a final judgment, its decision focused on the 
veracity of Nike’s speech.  Justice Kennedy also reiterated the argument that 
Nike’s statements involved an issue of public debate, and that commercial 
speakers will have to exercise discretion in their speech with which their 
opponents are not burdened (Nike, Inc. et al. v. Kasky, 2003).  
Among supporters Nike had as it went before the U. S. Supreme Court were 
labor unions (aggressive protestors of Nike’s production standards) (Goldstein 
2002-2003).  Also supporting Nike was the American Civil Liberties Union (Brief 
Amici Curiae, 2002).  
Results of Kasky v. Nike 
Goldstein (2003-2004), who had filed as a friend of the court on behalf of Nike at 
the U. S. Supreme Court later said the court’s refusal to hear the case would 
chill corporate speech. He fully expected that the court would eventually 
overturn the California Supreme Court ruling.  He noted that an immediate 
result of Kasky v. Nike was an application of its ruling by People for the Ethical 
Treatment of Animals to remove web site statements by Kentucky Fried Chicken 
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regarding the treatment of chickens.  PETA dropped the suit when KFC agreed 
to change language on its web site. 
 
Nike itself settled with Marc Kasky for $1.5 million to be paid over three 
years to the Fair Labor Association (Kang, 2003).   
Ramifications for Marketers 
Despite the claim of the majority at the California Supreme Court, and separate 
from the serious issues of labor practices in Southeast Asia, Kasky v. Nike would 
seem to provide a risk of chilling free speech in what could be relatively benign 
situations.  That’s because in corporate messaging, whether by advertising or by 
other means, there can be disagreements.  For instance, the Federal Trade 
Commission regularly challenges claims in advertising.  Marketers receiving 
such challenges may genuinely disagree with FTC opinions.  Does the 
disagreement on the part of marketers mean the marketers desire to engage in 
false advertising?  Or is it just a matter of differing opinions about what 
constitutes truth or accuracy?   
Based upon how Kasky v. Nike now stands, businesses can be put at a 
disadvantage when expressing opinions dissenting from that of challengers.  The 
challengers have free reign to voice criticism against the marketer; the marketer 
is limited to “truthful” response, which can be difficult if the challengers are the 
only ones able to disseminate what it views as truth. For example, a 
manufacturer may be in compliance with long-standing law and regulations 
regarding air emissions. However, a challenge may develop from an 
environmental activist group possessing an alternative interpretation of how air 
emission regulations are to be enforced.  The challengers provide information, 
similar to what happened in Kasky, indicating that the manufacturing company 
is, based on the challengers’ interpretation, polluting the air and such 
information is disseminated through the news media and on the internet.  The 
limitations of Kasky mean that the manufacturer would not be able to present to 
the public its own interpretation of air emission regulation due to risks of being 
accused of false advertising.  
In addition, businesses under Kasky v. Nike can be burdened with great 
technical, scientific, legal, accounting or other professional expense in proving 
the veracity of their claims, while challengers need only call a news conference 
or post a web site.  Also, growing applications of social media in reviewing 
business products and practices present the need for companies to respond to 
myriad criticisms and attacks, some legitimate, some spurious.   
As indicated by the California Court of Appeal, an issue worthy of public 
debate would be restricted due to allegations of false advertising in the response 
of a business to challengers: “The high court (U. S. Supreme Court) has never 
held that commercial speech must have as its only purpose the advancement of  
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an economic  transaction,  and  it has explained instead that commercial speech 
may be intermingled with noncommercial speech” (Kasky v. Nike California 
Supreme Court, 2002: 19, emphasis in original). 
In her dissent in the California Supreme Court decision, Justice Brown said 
increased commercialism, politicization of commerce, and more sophisticated 
advertising mean “the gap between commercial and noncommercial speech is 
rapidly shrinking.  As several commentators have observed, examples of the 
intersection between commercial speech and various forms of noncommercial 
speech, including scientific, political, and religious speech, abound”  (Kasky v. 
Nike California Supreme Court, 2002, 26). Indeed, a company’s operations – 
communication about which the California Supreme Court majority held to be 
commercial speech – “may be the subject of public debate in the media,” 
according to Justice Brown. “These operations may even be a political issue as 
organizations, such as state, local, or student governments, propose and pass 
resolutions condemning certain business practices.”  Given such situations, 
business operations become public concern and deserve full First Amendment 
protection  (Kasky v. Nike, California Supreme Court, 2002: 30).  
At this writing, there are controversial business-related public issues 
foretold by Justice Brown, including scientific issues regarding claims of climate 
change, political issues regarding corporate personhood, and religious issues 
regarding federal mandates involving contraception and abortion coverage in 
employer-provided health insurance.  
For companies doing business in California (including out-of-state 
companies entering California on the internet), Kasky represents a ticking time 
bomb for unwary marketers.  Finally, influence of the California Supreme Court 
is far-reaching, as its decisions are followed by more courts around the country 
than any other in the United States (Dear and Jessen, 2007). 
References 
Association of Nat. Advertiser, Inc. v. Lungren (1994) 44 F. 3d 726. 
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp. (1983) 463 U.S. 60. 
Bigelow v. Virginia (1975) 421 U.S. 809. 
Board of Trustees of State Univ. of N. Y. v. Fox (1989) 492 U. S. 469, 477. 
Brief Amici Curiae (2002) of the American Civil Liberties Union and the ACLU of 
Northern California in Support of Petitioner in Nike, Inc., et al. v.  
Marc Kasky in the Supreme Court of the United States, October Term No. 02-575.  
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. v. Public Service Commission (1980) 447 U. S. 557. 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission (2010) 558 U. S. 50. 
52 | Atlantic Marketing Journal Lurking First Amendment Time Bomb for Marketers 
 
 Message Sequencing in New Product Introduction 
 
52 | Atlantic Marketing Journal Message Sequencing in New Product Introduction 
 
 
48 Hours, 1996 [Television transcript] CBS, 17 October 1996 from Boycott Nike 
web site. Available at: www.vietnet/web/nike/public _html/48hrfmt.htm.  
Dear J and Jessen EW (2007) “Followed rates” and leading state cases, 1940-
2005. 41 U.C.Davis Law Review 683, 694. 
Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. (1995) 515 U. S. 618, 623. 
Goldstein TC (2002-2003)  Nike v. Kasky and the definition of “commercial 
speech.” Cato Supreme Court Review. Available at http://www.cato.org/ 
pubs/scr/2003/commercialspeech.pdf  
Gordon & Breach Science Publishers v. AIP (1994) S.D.N.Y. 859 F. Supp 1521. 
Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964) 378 U.S. 184. 
Kang, S 2003 Nike settles case with an activist for $1.5 million.  The Wall Street 
Journal. 15 September: A10. 
Kasky v. Nike California Court of Appeal (2000) No. A086142. 79 Cal.App.4th, 
179. 
Kasky v. Nike (1998) in the Superior Court of the State of California in and for 
the City and County of San Francisco, Case No. 994446.  
Kasky v. Nike, Inc. (2002)27 Cal.4th 939 , 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 296; 45 P.3d 243. 
Available at http://law.justia.com/cases/california/cal4th/27/939.html (page references 
for quotations stem from copying online case to Microsoft Word document in 12-
point type). 
Knight G and Greenberg J (2002) Promotionalism and subpolitics – Nike and its 
labor critics. Management Communication Quarterly 15 (4): 541-570. 
National Commission on Egg Nutrition v. Federal Trade Commission (1977) 570 
F.2d 157. 
Nike, Inc. Et Al. v. Kasky (2003) 539 US 654 Supreme Court No.02-575  
http://scholar.google.com/scholar_case?case=10117530542504027571&hl=en&a
s_sdt=2&as_vis=1&oi=scholarr [Accessed 12 June 2012]. 
Oxycal Laboratories, Inc. v. Jeffers S.D. Cal. (1995) 909 F. Supp. 719. 
Thornhill v. Alabama (1940) 310 U.S. 88, 101-102. 
Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Consumer Council (1976) 425 U. S. 748. 
 




Landry, Michael J. 
 
Dr. Landry is Professor of Marketing in the College of Business and Technology 
at Northeastern State University in Tahlequah, Oklahoma, and coordinator of 
the college’s supply chain management program.  He has a Ph.D. in marketing 
with a transportation emphasis from the University of Arkansas.  His areas of 
academic interest are in business history, primarily in transportation, 
broadcasting, and public policy and regulatory issues.  
